JOHN WILLIAM BURGESS
THE EUROPEAN WAR OF 1914
Its
Causes, Purposes, and Probable Results
1915
CHAPTER I
p. 1—44
1
THE
EUROPEAN WAR OF 1914
—————
CHAPTER I
THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
TO a man who, for nearly fifty years, has been
accustomed almost daily to read and interpret diplomatic papers, and
whose profession it was for nearly forty years to teach others how to
read and interpret them, it seems a remarkable phenomenon that the
British White Paper has been, with such unanimity, in this country,
assumed to show that Sir
Edward Grey was the prime apostle of peace
throughout the period of active diplomatic intercourse just preceding
the outbreak of the war which is now devastating Europe. I have read
all of the numbers of this paper through many times and can repeat
verbatim the language of those which are pivotal and crucial, and I am
quite sure that
2 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
there is
another way to interpret that paper, a way more consistent in theory,
more intelligible throughout, and more naturally connected with
preceding movements, than the interpretation so generally regarded in
this country as the only possible one.
In approaching this subject I will ask my readers to
keep three things well in mind. The first is that this British White
Paper does not present the causes of this war nor its purposes, but
only the occasions of it. The causes of the war lie far back of
anything contained in this paper. They are, as will be demonstrated
more fully in the next chapter, the determination of Russia to dominate
the Balkan lands and to extend her empire to the Bosphorus, the
Ægean, and the Adriatic; the determination of France to make
conquest of Elsass-Lothringen, and the determination of Great Britain
to repress the political, industrial and commercial growth of Germany.
These three things constituted for years before the outbreak of this
war the chief perils threatening the life and prosperity of
3 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
the German
Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So long as they could be kept
apart, peace could reign in Europe, but when they were brought together
in what was first called the Triple Entente, and this Entente was
developed into the Military Alliance of August, 1914, then peace left
the world, when to return God only knows. This British White Paper is
simply the history, from the British point of view, of the way in which
this development was accomplished.
In the second place, let it be always kept in mind
that diplomatic papers are not sermons by sincere God-fearing
clergymen, nor scientific essays whose purpose is the demonstration of
truth, but that the language of them is frequently chosen and employed
to cover up the real purpose and to produce results different from,
sometimes contradictory to, those professed to be desired. In reading
diplomatic papers, one must be able to read not only between the lines,
but behind the lines and before the lines and around the lines, and one
must never forget that the re-
4 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
sults actually
produced were those probably intended by the successful party.
In the third place, one must remember that most
diplomatic correspondence is verbiage and is modified by secret verbal
agreements. One must be able to select the parts which contain the gist
of the proposition or the argument and free it from the nebulosity with
which it is surrounded, for the most part intentionally surrounded, and
to apprehend the verbal understandings which give them their real
meaning.
Naturally, the first thought of the world after the
brutal murders of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire on June 28, at Sarajevo, was what
Austria-Hungary would do about it. Nobody entertained the idea that
such crime would be allowed to pass unpunished. The Austro-Hungarian
government began immediately an investigation which lasted until the
close of the third week in July, and on July 23 it made declaration of
what it had discovered and what it intended to do.
5 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
It affirmed that it had found that the assassination of the Prince and
Princess was planned in Belgrade; that high Servian officials were
implicated in it; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers
were provided had been given to them by Servian officials and
functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana,
the society for
exciting revolution among Austrian Servians against the
Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, "that the passage into
Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by
the chief officials of the Servian frontier service."
The Austro-Hungarian Government furthermore declared
that the assassinations at Sarajevo were connected with, and the
natural outcome of, subversive movements for disrupting the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and detaching certain of its parts, which had
been for years in progress in Servia; that these movements were
participated in by members of the Servian race living or sojourning in
the Austro-Hungarian Empire; that the Ser-
6 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
vian
government itself knowingly allowed these movements to go on unhindered
in the press, in the schools, and in the revolutionary societies, in
spite of the promises which that government had, March 31, 1909, made
to the Austro-Hungarian Government of friendly and neighborly conduct;
and that the Austro-Hungarian Government could not, in view of this
situation, "pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance
which they had maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched
at Belgrade and thence propagated in Austria-Hungary," but were now in
duty bound to put an end to the intrigues which formed a perpetual
menace to the tranquillity of the Empire.
On the basis of these statements and explanations
the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded of the Servian Government that
it should publicly proclaim in its official journals that the
government condemned the propaganda against Austria-Hungary and
repudiated it, regretted the participation of Servian officials in it,
deplored its criminal
7 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
results, and
warned both officials and private persons that it would proceed with
the utmost rigor against anybody who should thereafter be guilty of
attempting to promote it.
The Austro-Hungarian Government also demanded, more
specifically, the suppression of publications inciting the people to
actions against the peace and integrity of Austria-Hungary, the
dissolution of all societies in Servia whose aim was the promotion of
this propaganda, the elimination from the public instruction of
everything encouraging the same, the removal of all officials from the
public service guilty of promoting this propaganda, the arrest and
trial of those officials shown by the Austro-Hungarian inquiry to have
been implicated in the assassinations of June 28, the prevention of
illicit traffic in arms and explosives from Servia across the frontier
between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the dismissal and punishment of the
Servian frontier officials who had facilitated the work of the
assassins, and explanation of the utterances of high Servian officials
8 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
approving the
murder of the Prince and Princess.
Finally, in order to make sure that the Servian
Government would sincerely meet these requirements, the
Austro-Hungarian Government demanded that representatives of
Austria-Hungary should be allowed to cooperate with the Servian
Government in the inquiry as to the accomplices on Servian territory in
the murders of the Prince and Princess, and in the suppression of
subversive movements directed against the integrity of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.
This was a firm and decided demand, but it was
required by the necessities of the situation. Here was a turbulent
community — I will not call it a state, because one of the chief
characteristics of a state is that it is organized, legalized morality
— a turbulent community guided largely in its acts and purposes by
insurgents, conspirators, and regicides, a community which had already
twice, between 1908 and 1914, by its lawless conduct brought
Austria-Hungary to the verge
9 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
of war, a
community which had, between the same periods, been under solemn and
express pledges to Austria-Hungary to cease its intrigues and
machinations against that country and to live in frank and friendly
relations with it, but which, in constant disregard of this pledge, and
of its duty independent of the same, continued to weave its plots for
the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and finally
instigated the foul murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian crown,
with the purpose of producing just what has happened, namely: a
European war for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian and the German
Empires. The demands, therefore, on the part of Austria-Hungary that
this criminal conspiracy and these criminal acts against her existence
should immediately cease, as well as the press and school propaganda
encouraging them, and that the chief conspirators should be brought to
justice, and that this should be undertaken under such cooperation on
the part of Austro-Hungarian representatives as would make it rea-
10 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
sonably
certain that it would be effectively accomplished, were well within the
boundaries of the provocation.
Only a little more than a year ago our government
demanded that a Mexican Government should step down and out because our
President believed that Huerta had had some part in the assassination
of his predecessor, Madero, and our government enforced this demand.
Let us suppose now that our own Vice-President and his wife had gone
for an official visit to Austin, Texas, and had there been
assassinated. In the execution of a plot hatched In Mexico
City, in which the highest officials of the Mexican Government had been
found to be implicated, and for the accomplishment of which the weapons
had been furnished from the Mexican Governmental arsenal, and that the
murderers and weapons had been knowingly passed across the frontier by
Mexican officials, and that all this had been done as part of a
conspiracy formed in Mexico, by the leaders of the country in and out
of the government, for detach-
11 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
ing Texas,
Arizona, New Mexico, and California from the United States and
re-connecting them with Mexico — what would the United States have
done? In view of what she did do, I think it fair to say that she would
have slapped Mexico off the face of the earth, and that in case any
other power in the world had interfered she would have told it to
attend to its own business and stand aside or it would be slapped aside
also.
The question between Austria-Hungary and Servia was
thus one involving the honor and existence of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, a question, therefore, in which, according to the existing
canons and practices of diplomacy, no other power had any right to
interfere, and which, according to these same canons and usages, was
not subject to arbitration. Moreover, the purpose of this demand was
entirely punitive. It was not an issue under which Austria was seeking
her own aggrandizement or to disturb the balance of power in Europe.
She solemnly declared that she would annex no foot of Servian terri-
12 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
tory, and as a
matter of fact she was striving to maintain the balance of power in
Europe disturbed and thrown out of joint by the machinations of the
powers of the Triple Entente through the Italian Tripoli expedition and
the recent war of the Balkan powers against Turkey.
I have in my possession at this moment a statement
from an important officer of the British Crown, which is dated
September 16, 1914, and contains the following paragraph:
My own private opinion is that Grey has
utterly
outmanoeuvred the Germans. He began the game by getting Italy to annex
Tripoli. Practically that was the end of the Triple Alliance, as now we
have a million of hostages in North Africa, and Italy dares not stir
against us. Then came the Balkan League financed by England and France
and, but for the idiotic vanity of King Ferdinand, we should have had
the war then. For the last three years England, France, and Russia have
been steadily preparing for the struggle and Germany stupidly played
the enemies' game.
The seduction of Italy, thus, from the Triple
Alliance, and the Balkan war against
13 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Turkey, ending
in the driving back of Turkey and in weakening her as a weight against
Russia in the Balkan peninsula, were the things which had, by the
beginning of the year 1914, so changed the balance of power between the
Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente as to threaten the very
existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. All the powers in both of
these combinations understood this perfectly and Great Britain more
than any other, and Sir Edward Grey more than any other man consciously
brought it to pass.
Immediately after the assassinations at Sarajevo,
which revealed to Austria-Hungary that the conspiracy against her
existence had become active, the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey struck
out upon a line entirely consistent with the antecedents to which I
have called attention, a line destined to bring war, a line which has
brought war, and a line which if not intended to bring war is evidence
of great dulness in the mind of its inventor. Before the demands of
Austria-Hungary had become known, he began inquiring of the
14 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
German
Ambassador in London and, through Great Britain's representative in
Berlin, of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, about them. The
German Ambassador declared that he had no information on the subject,
but the British Charge in Berlin telegraphed to him, Grey, that the
German Foreign Minister
insisted that the question
at
issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that
there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between
these two countries; that he had, therefore, considered it inadvisable
that the Austro-Hungarlan Government should be approached by the German
Government on the matter. — (British White
Paper No. 2, July
22,
1914.)
This was absolutely the correct attitude diplomatically towards the
subject, and it was the insistence of Great Britain and the other
powers of the Triple Entente to depart from it which started the ball
rolling in the wrong direction.
On the next day Sir Edward Grey had a rather sharp
discussion with Count
Mens-
15 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
dorff,
the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, in which he protested against a
time limit, which Count Mensdorff had indicated might be contained in
the Austro-Hungarian demands, and virtually threatened him with Russian
interference. Count Mensdorff called attention, in justification of a
time limit, to the fact that Servia had utterly disregarded her
plighted word, given five years before, to live on neighborly terms
with Austria-Hungary, and had pursued her hostile purposes against
Austria-Hungary, and that it had become necessary for Austria-Hungary
to protect herself promptly. Moreover, Count Mensdorff indicated to Sir
Edward Grey that St. Petersburg was the place where restraint should be
exercised. — (British White Paper No. 3.)
On July 24, the contents of the Austro-Hungarian
demand upon Servia were communicated by Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward
Grey, and the latter immediately declared to the former that he had
"never before seen one state address to another inde-
16 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
pendent state
a document of so formidable a character," and remarked that Great
Britain would enter into an exchange of views with other powers. — (No.
5.)
On the same day Sir Edward Grey received a dispatch
from the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg which manifested a high
state of excitement on the part of the Russian government. It ran:
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was
both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
unless Germany had been first consulted; some of her demands were quite
impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His (Britannic) Majesty's
government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and
France. The Ambassador went on to say that in his opinion Russia and
France had already determined to intervene between Austria-Hungary and
Servia, and that the Russian Foreign Minister had informed him that he
thought that Russian mobilization would have to be carried out. — (No.
6, July 24.)
17 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Here now was the great opportunity for a peace-loving British Foreign
Minister, if he were genuinely peace-loving and not a pretender, to get
in the finest work of his life. What would such a British Foreign
Minister have replied to the excited requests from Russia to intervene
in this Austro-Hungarian-Servian question. I think he would have said:
This is a local question between Austria-Hungary and
Servia, a question in regard to which we have no right to intervene,
and we must keep our hands off. Moreover, it is a question involving
the honor and existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a question,
therefore, which, according to the canons of diplomacy, is not
arbitrable, and we should not insist upon, or propose, its arbitration.
It is true that we may think the demands on Servia peremptory, but we
must consider that foul murders have been committed, the murder of the
heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife, and that
Austria-Hungary claims that this has been accomplished by the
cooperation of Servian officials in execution of a plot formed at
Belgrade, a plot for disrupting the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
And we must remember that Servia is a rest-
18 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
less,
turbulent community, a community in which, only ten years ago, high
officials, the leaders of the party still in power in Servia, wantonly
assassinated their own King and Queen and pitched their dead bodies out
of the window to be kicked and spat upon by the mob, a community which
has long been the firebrand of Southeastern Europe, while
Austria-Hungary is a great, highly-civilized state which has rendered
inestimable service to the culture and civilization of Europe, among
many other things, in halting and settling the Magyars, in defending
Europe against the invasion of the Moslem, and in holding the Slav, the
Magyar, and the German together in the bonds of a peaceful empire for
the last fifty years.
We must trust the word of Austria-Hungary, which
during the last few years has manifested great forbearance toward
Servia, that she will exact only a just measure of satisfaction for the
crimes that have been committed against her. If it should prove later
that she is going beyond this and is encroaching upon general European
interests, then will be the time for us to interfere. To do so before
then would be immoral and provocative on our part.
Now do we find anything like this from Sir Edward
Grey in the numbers of the Brit-
19 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
ish White
Paper? I cannot discover it, but instead of it we find just what, as it
seems to me, a very clever diplomatist would do, who desired to bring
about a war of extermination against the German and Austro-Hungarian
Empires, and at the same time throw the responsibility for it upon the
shoulders of his victims. Now what would be the elements of the plan of
such a foreign minister intent upon such a purpose? Would it not be as
follows?
1. To assume the correct diplomatic attitude for his
own government of non-interference in the question between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, but at the same time to encourage Servia to
resist the demands of Austria-Hungary by pronouncing them extravagant
and peremptory.
2. To encourage some other power, in this case
Russia, to interfere between them by representing that Russia had some
special legitimate interest in intervening, some special right to
intervene.
3. To propose arbitration of the question between
Russia and Austria-Hungary raised by the intervention of Russia in the
question between Austria-Hungary and Servia.
20 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
4. To represent Germany as responsible for the failure to bring about
arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary, without
explaining that this was really arbitration of the question between
Austria-Hungary and Servia.
5. To do nothing to restrain Russian mobilization.
6. To encourage France to sustain Russia.
7. To refuse to enter into any understanding with
Germany on any conditions.
8. To find, at the last moment an issue, an
apparently unselfish issue, under which to enter into the great
struggle.
Now let us see from the evidence contained in the
British White Paper itself if this was not the exact course of the
diplomacy followed by the British Foreign Minister.
(First.) Did he encourage Servia to resist the
Austro-Hungarian demands?
On July 24, he said to the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador In London "that he had never before seen one state address
to another Independent state a document of so formidable a character,"
criticising par-
21 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
ticularly the
demand made by Austria-Hungary that Austro-Hungarian representatives
should be allowed to cooperate with Servian officials in the
investigation relating to the participation of Servian officials and
subjects in the assassination at Sarajevo, and in suppressing the
movements against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the
same time, he disclaimed any concern on the part of his government with
the merits of the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia. — (British
White Paper No. 5.)
On the same day, he telegraphed to the British Chargé
d'Affaires at Belgrade that Servia ought to give Austria-Hungary
fullest satisfaction should it be proven that Servian officials had had
any part in the Sarajevo murders, that Servia "ought certainly
to
express concern and regret;'' for the rest, however, that "the
Servian government must reply to the Austrian demands as they
consider
best in Servian interests." * (No. 12.) The Chargé
was authorized to repeat this to
* Italics mine, J. W. B.
22 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
the Servian
Government after consulting his French and Russian colleagues at
Belgrade. That the Servian Government understood completely the
position of the British Government as encouraging Servia to resist the
Austro-Hungarian demands is clearly manifest from the telegram sent by
the British Chargé at Belgrade to Sir Edward Grey after
the reply of the Servian government to the Austro-Hungarian note, which
telegram reads: "I have been requested by the Prime Minister to convey
to you the expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you
made on the 27th inst, in the House of Commons.'' — (No. 83.)
(Second.) Did Sir Edward Grey encourage Russia
to intervene in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia?
On July 24, he instructed the British Ambassador in
Paris that if Russia took the view of the Austro-Hungarian demands on
Servia, which it seemed to him any power interested in Servia would
take,* he would
* Italics mine, J. W. B.
23 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
be powerless
to do anything with Russia. (No. 10.) Of course this
communication was immediately imparted to the French Government and
from the French Government to the Russian Government.
On the 25th, he telegraphed to the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the peremptory character of the
Austro-Hungarian note to Servia made it almost inevitable that Russia
and Austria-Hungary would quickly mobilize against each other. (No.
24.)
On the 25th, he instructed the British Ambassador at
Vienna to support the steps taken by the Russian Ambassador at Vienna
in making a demand upon the Austro-Hungarian Government for an
extension of the time limit imposed by the Austrian note for the
Servian reply and for furnishing data on which the Austrian note was
based. (No. 26.) Here was not only an encouragement to Russia
to intervene in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but a
participation in that intervention, and that, too, after the disclaimer
of any concern on the part of
24 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
his government
in the merits of the question, as noted in No. 5.
On the 27th, he telegraphed to the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Germany and Austria-Hungary ought to
understand from the concentration of the British fleet that Great
Britain might not stand aside. — (No. 47.)
(Third.) Did Sir Edward Grey propose mediation of
the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary raised by the
intervention of Russia in the question between Austria-Hungary and
Servia?
On the 25th of July, he telegraphed to the British Chargé
d'Affaires in Berlin that he had said to the German Ambassador in
London that Russian and Austro-Hungarian mobilization would apparently
soon take place and that he had suggested mediation between them by
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. — (No. 25.)
On the 26th, he telegraphed to the British
Ambassador In Paris his proposition for mediation in so general and
comprehensive
25 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
terms that
when it was repeated to the British Ambassador in Vienna and
communicated by the latter to the Russian and French Ambassadors there,
these men said that while they felt satisfaction with the proposition "they
doubted whether the principle of Russia being an interested party
entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian
dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German
Government."* — (Nos. 36 and 40.)
On the 27th, he informed the British Ambassador in
Berlin that he had said to the German Ambassador in London that the
Servian reply had gone farther than could have been expected and that
the German Government should urge moderation at Vienna. — (No. 46.)
His proposition at that moment was that the German
Government should urge upon the Austro-Hungarian Government to make the
Servian note, which rejected the crucial demands of the
Austro-Hungarian Govern-
* Italics mine, J. W. B.
26 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
ment, a basis
for discussion. The German Government felt great embarrassment in doing
this, feeling that it might irritate the Austro-Hungarian Government,
but yielded to the British request.
That the German Government was correct in this
forecast was immediately shown by the answer of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to the proposition, namely, that it was too late for that,
and by the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Servia. (No. 75.)
Evidently the German Government was diplomatically correct in its
desire to treat the Austro-Hungarian-Servian question as a matter
between those two states alone, and that in yielding to the persuasions
of Sir Edward Grey to step in, where neither it nor any other
government had any right to interfere, had come dangerously near to
getting a snub from its only ally.
The position of the German Government was now most
embarrassing. It had no such influence over the actions of
Austria-Hungary as has been ascribed to it by the all-wise
27 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
newspaper
editors. Austria-Hungary is the proudest state on the European
Continent and one of the oldest. Its imperial-royal house wore the
crown of Charlemagne for 500 years, and, in its view, the German Empire
is a newcomer. Its diplomatists are among the most skilled and
accomplished statesmen of Europe. Of course, they were justly offended
at Russia's assuming to forbid Austria-Hungary from securing such
satisfaction for her grievances against Servia as she considered
necessary to her honor and safety. Of course, they knew that Great
Britain was acting with duplicity in pretending to hold to the correct
attitude of non-interference for herself and at the same time
encouraging Servia to resist and Russia to interfere. And of course,
they felt that their German ally should not yield to either Great
Britain or Russia or both in giving any countenance to such a departure
from correct and usual diplomacy.
Sazonof and
Grey knew these things, too, but,
instead of giving due weight to the
28 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
embarrassment
of the German Government, they undertook to make it the scapegoat in
their work of developing, through these incidents, the Entente into a
Military Alliance. They not only cared nothing for the embarrassment
they were creating for Germany in declaring that Germany's control over
Austria-Hungary was the key to the situation, but it was with them a
new point gained to increase, at every turn and move, that
embarrassment in order to alienate, if possible, Austria-Hungary from
Germany. That this embarrassment was clearly understood by the British
Government is to be surely concluded from the dispatch received July 29
by Sir Edward Grey from the British Ambassador in Berlin. It reads:
I found Secretary of State very depressed
today. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to
be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were
being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and
present a fait accompli. This had in fact now happened, and he
was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servians
reply offered a
29 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
basis
for discussion had not hastened the declaration.
(No. 76.)
(Fourth.) Did Sir Edward Grey attempt to make it
appear that Germany was responsible for the failure to bring about
arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary without
explaining that this was really arbitration of the unarbitrable
question between Austria-Hungary and Servia?
On July 29, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador
in Rome that he had anticipated the German objections to mediation by
the powers by asking the German Government to suggest any form of
procedure under which it might be applied. (No. 92.) He claimed
that the German Government had accepted the proposition for such
interference by the powers in principle, although the German Government
had expressed great misgivings about the interference of the powers in
such a question and had suggested direct communication between Russia
and Austria-Hungary as the proper mode of dealing with it. — (No.
43.)
30 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
The trouble was that the German Government regarded Sir Edward Grey's
proposition for mediation as being practically arbitration, and had
held from the first, quite correctly, that the question between Russia
and Austria-Hungary was in substance the question between
Austria-Hungary and Servia and was not arbitrable. While Sir Edward
Grey sought to give another meaning to his proposed mediation, he still
made no distinction between questions which might be properly brought
under it and those which might not, which was the point of
embarrassment for the German Government. The world, however, can, he
knew, be relied on to take things more in the rough and to regard
objection to mediation as evidence of desire for war. The British White
Paper evidently encourages this view. — (No. 84.)
(Fifth.) Did Sir Edward Grey do anything to
restrain Russian mobilization?
On July 29, he received official notice from the
British Ambassador in Berlin that Russia was mobilizing her forces
against Austria-
31 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Hungary. (No.
76.) Also from the Russian Ambassador In London. (No. 70.)
On the same day, he gave the German Ambassador In London to understand
that Great Britain would not attempt to exert any influence upon Russia
to stand aside in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia and
allow those two states to settle it themselves. (No. 90.) At
the same time he indicated to the Austrian Ambassador in London that he
regarded Russia as having some particular interest in Servia. — (No.
91.)
On July 31, he received from the British Ambassadors
In Berlin and St. Petersburg notice that Russia was mobilizing on the
German frontier, at the very moment when, on request of the Czar, the
Emperor was attempting to secure an understanding between Russia and
Austria-Hungary. (Nos. 108 and 113.) And on the same day he
instructed the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg that the German
Ambassador in London had asked him "to urge the Russian
32 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Government to
show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military
preparations," and that he had said to the Ambassador that he "did not
see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were
put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia." (No. 110.)
On the same day he received the thanks of the Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs for his attitude. — (No. 120.)
(Sixth.) Did Sir Edward Grey encourage France to
sustain Russia?
On July 29, he informed the British Ambassador in
Paris that he had told Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, that so
long as the question was one between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Great
Britain would not feel called upon to take a hand in it, but if Germany
became involved and France became involved, then Great Britain would
have to consider, and that the French Ambassador had indicated that
this was satisfactory, since if Germany attacked Russia, France was
bound to help Russia. (No.
33 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
87.)
Both of these men knew, of course, that if Russia attacked
Austria-Hungary, Germany was bound, under the provisions of the Triple
Alliance, to go to the aid of Austria-Hungary. This would not in reason
be an attack by Germany on Russia, but France was determined to so
regard it. In fact. Grey and Cambon had arranged for such a situation
two years before. — (No. 105.)
Sir Edward Grey also informed the British
Ambassador in Paris in this dispatch that he was on the point of
informing the German Ambassador in London that Germany must not presume
upon the neutrality of Great Britain. He also referred to the fact that
the British fleet, which had some time before been concentrated in the
Channel, ostensibly for a review, had not been dispersed, in other
words that the British fleet was mobilized. This was all intended, of
course, for the French Government and could not have failed to assure
France that if, in a war between Russia and Germany, France should
34 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
take up arms
in support of Russia, Great Britain would take up arms in support of
France.
When, therefore, Germany asked France if she would
remain neutral in a war between Russia and Germany, France replied that
she would consult her own interests.
On August 2, Sir Edward Grey received from the
British Ambassador in Berlin information that he, the Ambassador, had
just been informed by the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs that
owing to the fact that Russian troops had crossed the German frontier,
Germany and Russia were in a state of war. (No. 144.) And on
the same day he, Sir Edward Grey, handed the French Ambassador in
London a memorandum which read: "I am authorized to give an assurance
that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North
Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping,
the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.'' (No.
148.)
Everything was now prepared for Great
35 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Britain to
join with France and Russia, and the final task of Sir Edward Grey was
to find the issue under which to bring this about.
(Seventh and Eighth.) Did Sir Edward Grey refuse
all understanding with Germany and finally effect the participation of
Great Britain in the war under a feigned issue?
What that issue was to be is first indicated in the
White Paper. (No. 101, dated July 30.) It is a dispatch sent by
Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin for communication,
of course, to the German Government. The tone of it is altogether
different from the usually quiet manner of this gentleman. It is
excited and extravagant and recriminatory. It is the tone of a man who
is conscious of the weakness of his position and is seeking to
strengthen it by magnifying some apparently vulnerable point in the
position of his adversary with the intent to put his adversary in a
false position.
In this dispatch he virtually accuses the German
Chancellor of trying to strike a bar-
36 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
gain with
Great Britain whereby Great Britain should remain neutral while Germany
should violate the neutrality of Belgium. This dispatch was an answer
to one he had received from his Ambassador in Berlin on the preceding
day informing him that the German Chancellor was most desirous to
remain on friendly terms with Great Britain and was ready, in case
Great Britain would remain neutral, in the event of war between Germany
and France, to give Germany's pledge not to take any French territory
in Europe. The only thing said about the neutrality of Belgium by the
Chancellor was that it would depend "upon the action of France what
operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium."
When this heated communication from Sir Edward Grey
was conveyed to the Chancellor, he was occupied with the menacing
position of Russia on the eastern frontier and he merely asked the
British Ambassador to leave the message with him for reflection before
answer. — (No. 109.)
37 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Sir Edward Grey now put the question to both the German and the French
Government whether they were prepared to give assurances of respecting
the neutrality of Belgium. (No. 115.) It is to be presumed that
Sir Edward Grey meant the neutrality of Belgium as guaranteed by the
Treaty of 1839. This Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France,
Austria, Russia, and Prussia. It had never been signed nor ratified by
the present German Empire. Did the German Empire, originating
thirty-two years after the signing of this Treaty and composed of
twenty-four other states besides Prussia, inherit the obligations of
Prussia? If so, had Belgium herself done anything or agreed to anything
before August 1, 1914, which could be regarded as imparity of treatment
by her of her guarantors and thus absolving the prejudiced guarantor
from his obligations? I will not undertake to answer these questions,
although I know the German Government claimed that she had. (No.
122.) I raise them only to show that Germany and France
38 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
did not stand
in the same position over against this question put to them by Great
Britain.
Moreover, as against France, Great Britain could
only be neutral or an ally. As against Germany, on the other
hand, Great Britain could only be neutral or an enemy. The
French Government could, therefore, answer at once and in the
affirmative without endangering its own interests. The German
Government, on the other hand, felt obliged to assure itself of the
neutrality of Great Britain before giving any pledge in regard to
Belgium.
On August 1, the German Ambassador in London asked
Sir Edward Grey, whether, if Germany promised not to invade Belgium,
Great Britain would engage to remain neutral, and Sir Edward Grey
answered that he could not say that. The Ambassador then pressed Sir
Edward Grey to formulate conditions upon which Great Britain would
remain neutral and suggested the willingness of Germany even to
guarantee the integrity
39 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
of France and
the French colonies on condition of the neutrality of Great Britain,
and Sir Edward Grey refused to promise neutrality upon any terms, even
of his own making, and declared his refusal to be definitive. — (No.
123.)
The German Empire here virtually proposed the same
arrangement in regard to Belgium as that entered into by Great Britain
and the North German Union and Great Britain and France in 1870,
namely, that Great Britain should, in a war between Germany and France,
remain neutral and with Germany guarantee Belgium against invasion by
France, and with France guarantee Belgium against invasion by Germany,
and Great Britain refused. Great Britain thus indicated to Germany that
she had determined to become a belligerent enemy to Germany in the
impending war and would not agree to remain neutral under any
conditions proposed by Germany or formulated by herself.
On the next day, August 2, Sir Edward
40 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
Grey, without
waiting for the final answer of the German Government to his demand
that Germany should, without regard to the attitude of Great Britain,
promise not to invade Belgium, gave, as we have already seen, assurance
to France that Great Britain would participate in the impending
conflict as the ally of France. (No. 148.) With this, Germany
was finally made to realize that the three great powers, commanding
half the world in area and population, were resolved to make war upon
her. In fact were already at war with her, and that her only chance was
to strike quick and hard and where the danger was most immediate.
Now this is how I read the British White Paper. It
is the way that one hundred and fifty millions of people in Europe read
it, not only Germans and Austrians, but Swiss, Dutch, Danes,
Scandinavians, and some Englishmen, and it is the way that twenty-five
millions of people in this country read it. I believe it is the way
every unprejudiced historian and diplomatist will read it twenty-
41 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
five years
from today. And it shows one of two things, namely: that Sir Edward
Grey consciously intended to bring about this war, at this time, from
the moment that he encouraged Servia to resist Austria-Hungary and
encouraged Russia to assert a protectorate over Servia, or that he is a
dullard and was an unwitting tool in the hands of the Russian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Sazonof.
I would rather think the latter, but in the way of
this stands his war speech in Parliament on August 3. It must be
remembered that at the time this speech was made the telegrams and
dispatches contained in the later-published White Paper, which we have
been citing, were known only to the British Cabinet. Parliament and the
people of Great Britain had no knowledge of them until several days
later.
In this war speech, Sir Edward Grey suppressed the
propositions contained in No. 123 of the British White Paper and in the
Emperor's telegram to King George of Au-
42 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
gust 1, in
which Germany went the whole length of virtually offering to agree not
to go to war with France at all, provided only Great Britain would
remain neutral and guarantee that France would do likewise; or, in case
Great Britain could not restrain France, not to invade Belgium and not
to make conquest of any French territory, European or colonial,
provided only great Britain would herself remain neutral.
The fact that Sir Edward Grey did this most
reprehensible thing, and, at the most critical moment, left the
impression upon the mind of Parliament and the people that the German
Government had made no reply to the British demands about Belgian
neutrality, indicate that he was playing the game of war-maker and not
peace-maker. The war was already an established fact as between Russia
and Germany, and he seems to have been determined not to allow Germany
to escape from the mortal peril of war on her western as well as her
eastern boundary at the same time. In other words, he seems
43 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
consciously to
have seized this promising opportunity for forcing Germany to solve her
problems with the different states of Europe all at once and against
their combined power. Even Englishmen doubt whether the British Cabinet
could have brought the Parliament and the people to the approval of its
war policy without that bit of deception practiced on them by the
Foreign Minister in that speech of August 3. Three members of the
Cabinet, the most honest and genuinely patriotic men in it, Morley,
Burns, and Trevelyan,
left the Cabinet rather than to be participant in
this policy; J.
Ramsey MacDonald, member of Parliament, denounced Sir
Edward Grey in unsparing terms for his disingenuousness; Arthur
Ponsonby pointedly asked the question in an article in the London
Nation: "Did the Prime Minister in referring to what he called the
infamous proposal at the same time draw attention to the German
Ambassador's request, at a later date, that we should formulate
the conditions on which we would re-
44 THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR
main neutral?"
and answered it "no," and C. H. Norman
declared that "Sir Edward Grey
laid a snare for the House of Commons, out of which, in the excited
condition of public opinion, the House could not be extricated with
honor and dignity."
Moreover, Sir Edward Grey declared in this same
speech of August 3, that the British fleet was already mobilized and
that the army was mobilizing, that the forces of the Crown were ready
and that, in the opinion of the Prime Minister and the First Lord of
the Admiralty, there was never a time when those forces were in a
higher state of readiness and efficiency than at that moment. With
regret I am compelled to say that through his own utterances. Sir
Edward Grey seems to me to convict himself of having consciously
followed a course of conduct leading directly to universal war.
Let us now turn to the causes of the war and examine
if they do not sustain this interpretation of the British White Paper.
Last update: August 12th, 2014
